% P22285:414OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCEJOHN WARNERnited states smat需EORIGINALGeneral Michael V HaydenWIZARDSUnited States Air ForceCentral Intelligence Agency大 LANGLEYDear General Hayden:A Symposium Commemorating 60 YearsPeck Iam writing to congratulate you and the members of the Directorate of Seience andUaited States The Directorate of Science and Technolog deserves great eredit for itheof s&T Intelligence Analysiswith the emergence of the cold war, the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)formed theOffice of Scientific Intelligence(os) in January of 1949 Since its creation, oSI has undergonethree name changes, assuming its present name in 1965 OSI's revolutionary projects, such asthe design and operation of national overhead systems, were vital in the nation's suceess duringthe cold war
The mportant work of osi and its successor organizations have comtinued to playa critical role in providing the United States with a signifieant advantage in intelligence andspecial operations through their involvement with such projects as the collection of signalsforeign missile andA : TABLE OF CONTENTSspare systems, and satellite developmentOverview of the office of scientific IntelligenceDuring my more than 50 years of public service, including 30 of those years representingthe Commonwealth of virginia in the United States Senate, the times our nation faces today are12-13the most complex, most dangerous, and most challenging I have seen The intelligencecommunity plays a vital role in our mation's success during such times Several of the mostIlL The Birth of OSIGeneral Order Number 13challenges the work of Ds&T will carry on its proud tradition of serving a monumental role inSherman Kent memo on S&T intelligenceence commuDs7 Congratulations again to all of those who worked so hard over the past 60 years and forIV Intelligence Productscontributions to the intelligence communiy and ou natSoviet Bloc Capabilities though 19With kind regards, I aTThe Sovirt Atomic Energy Program to Mid-19573SincerelySoviet Capabilities and Probable Programsin the Guided Missle Feildchn WarINIE 11-6-7 n-s w Iis (and Probable Prog/amy Abilities00d3
C00629617-TOP SECRETThe office of Scientific Intelligence, 1949-68I BackgroundWW II saw the first stirrings of U S intelligenceinterest⊥nscientific and technical capabilitiesf foreign countries, Largely under the impetus ofGerman development of radar, missiles and diverseweapons-related technologies, the separate armed serv-ices and var⊥ ous committees of the off⊥ ce of sc⊥ent1f1cResearch and Development (OSRD) became customers forscientific and technical intelligence on foreignactivities In these wartime years information onsuch subjects was most often obtained through combatintelligence and the exploitation of captured materiel,with occasional assists from clandestine and interceptoperations, British success in fathoming German secretweapons programs contributed to the awakening ofinterest in us
official circlesIn the early 40s, however, no discrete U sorganization could be labeled an office of scientificintelligence" Scientific and technical intelligencewas more an offshoot of the interests of the researchand development (R&D) elements than an entity in itsown right In rather distinct contrast, the Britishhad an identifiable unit under Dr R V Jones in the-OP SECRET-
C00629617-OP SECRET-Intelligence Branch, Air Ministry which played amayor role in the wartime efforts against Germanaircraft and secret weapons programsOne exception to this general state of affairsin the US was a foreign intelligence unit, theForeign Intelligence Branch, in the Manhattan EngineeringDistrict (MED), the wartime agency under GeneralLeslie Groves concerned with nuclear weapons development
It may be recalled that considerable fear wasfelt in some quarters, as the feasibility of nuclearweapons seemed increasingly assured, that the germansmight be carrying on a nuclear weapons program Itwas reasoned that the early experiments on atomicfission had been performed by Germans, notably theNobel Prize winners otto Hahn and Lisa Meitner, andhence German understanding of the underlying principlesof nuclear weapons was as great as ours Attempts toestablish the existence of a German program throughclandestine operations were not altogether reassuringnxiety continued throughout the war in the West andeven into the final stages of the war against JapanAt the close of the war, while the soul-searchinginto the Pearl Harbor disaster was taking place, thesets of the office of Strategic Services (oss)weretransferred in 1946 to an interim agency, the Central千 fOP SECRIORIGINAL WIZARDS OF LANGLEY
TOP: SECRETntelligence Group (CIG), under the general surveil-lance of a National Intelligence Authority Thiswas the first attempt to consolidate and centralizethe highest level intelligence functions of the U sIn ciG the analytical functions were centeredin the office of Research and Evaluation (ORB)*Under the persistent urging of the Joint Research andDevelopment Board (JRDB), ** the peace-time successorto the oSRDThrough anagreement be tween General Groves and GeneralHoyt s, Vandenberg, the Director of the CIG, theForeign Intelligence Branch of MED was transferred to*The office of Research and Evaluation, organized22 July 1946, was renamed the office of Reports and Estimateson 27 October of the same year**Eventually an agreement, entitled Program forJRDB-CIG cooperation in the field of scientific intel11gence, was signed by Gen Hoyt s
Vandenberg andDr Vannevar Bush on 10 January 1947 The agreementfollowed much discussion and investigation by JRDB Itas perhaps the first high-level recognition of thedesirability of combining intelligence considerationswith scientific and military factors in the planning ofweapons R&d in the U sTOP SECRET一
C00629617TOP-SECRETthe CIG on 25 February 1947 and assigned to theby order of theDDCI on 28 March 1947As might be expectedwas seriously hamperedby lack of experienced personnel
of equal importance,it also lacked sources of information and there isevidence to suggest that its support from top management was less than vigorousDespite these shortcomings of thethe JRDBpersisted in its demands for intelligence supportduring 1946-47 and into early 1948 withand Ralph L Clark* as the two most outspoken advocates4FOfSECRET-
c00629617-TOP SECRETIn its testimony before the Eberstadt Commitee ofthe Hoover Commission* in 1848 the JRDB voiced1ta general dissatisfaction with the intelligencesupport it was receiving Prompted by this view,which one can imagine was presented with vigor byDr Bush (Chairman, RDB) backed up by Ralph Clark,the Eberstadt committee in turn expressed its vewag followB:The Committee is particularly concern-ed over the nation's inadequacies in thefields of scientific and medical intelligenceThere are d1cu1t。 s pecu11 ar to th自Situation which the Committee hag not over-looked
Yet the vital importance of reliableand up-to-date scentific and medical information 1s such as to call for far greaterefforts than appear to have been devoted tothis essential need in the past"Persistent JRDB prodding of CIG and CIA may well havebeen the most important external pressure leading tothe eventual establishment of oSIWith the passage of the National Security Actof 1947 and the creation of the CIA, the heretoforeuncertain responsibilities of the CIG gave way to thestatutorily defined mission of a greatly strengthenedand centralized intelligence service, the CIA Thechange to a more encompassing role for cIA and thegrowing capabilities of the military intelligenceMore properly named the Committee on the NationalSecurity Organization of the Commiasion on Reorganizationof the Executive Branch of the Government5TOP SECREL
c00629617TOP SECRETagencies prompted Admiral Hillenkoetter, who hadsucceeded General Vandenberg, to ask Dr Bush in1948 whether the old JRDB-CIG agreement shouldnot be supplanted Bush's reply was both assentand complaint for he felt that the Agency had neverreally begun to satisfy JRDB's needs He agreed,however, in a letter of 26 March 1948 to set aside theformal agreementIn particular, the coordinating and estimateproducing functions of the new Agency were morefirmlyes greatly increasedover those of the old More or less concurrently,the period of uncertainty about the true intentionsof the USSR and its threat to the us ended Doubtsabout the reality of a U
s monopoly in nuclearweapons were fed by reports of Soviet in terest inthe advanced technology acquired from the GermansThere was an increasing sense of urgency aboutstrengthening the Us intelligence postureAt about the same time as the eberstadt committeewas making its review for the Hoover Commission in1948 another and separate review was being conduc tedfor the National Security Council (NSC) by a teaminsisting of Allen W Dulles, William H Jackson,and Mathias F Correa The latter investigationTOP SECRET
TOP SECRETresulted in the so-called Dulles Report of l January1949 which had this to say about scientific intel-ligandwe bel⊥ eve that there is an oby⊥ousneed for more centralization of scientificintelligence Where centralization 1s notpractical there should be the closestcoordinatio
n among the existing agenciesthrough the use of committees such as thepresent interdepartmental atomic energyintelligence committee which works in con-sultation with thethe office of SpecIal operations(A strongservice wIthin the central Intelligence Agencywould be the logical focal point for thecoordination and appropriate centralizationof scientific intelligenceThere appearsto be po overriding reason for the segregationof thewithin the officeof Special Operations, and it would be preferable, to reattach this Group to theeven though some insulation may benecessary for security reasons "fTo fulfill its responsibilities as thechief analytical and evaluating unit forscientific intelligence, and consequently asthe principal guide for collection, the Branchwould have to be staffed by scientists of thehighest qualificationse appreciate that insuch a Branch it would be impossible to obtaina leading scientist for each of the many segments of scientific and technological intelligence,wwe understand that since this report was writtensteps have been taken to create a separate office ofScientific Intelligence which is to include the(Author's Note: The foregoing sentencwas a Footnote to the Dulles Report NSC approval ofthe portions of the Dulles Report dealing with thestrengthening of scientific intelligence did not comeuntil 7 July 1949 CIA in the meantime had moved toes tablish OSI without waiting for NSC action)TOP SEGRET-
c00269294UNCLASSIFIED( IMSWINPAChe historicaections Division(HCD)e officeformatioe Weapons Intelligence, Noreration, and Arms Control Center (WINPAc)Services is responsible for executing the CIAs Historical Review Program This programs the Directoraks to identify, collect, and review for possible release to the public significarign weapons and technology, nonproliferand arms control-related issuesCD is toWINPAC's aProvide an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligencee production of all-source intelligence relating to the threat of foreign strategit has helped shape the foundation of major Us policy dedeeapons (WMD); missileand space systems; and emerging conventional threatsountermeasuressons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize thecope and context of past actionMonitoringance to arms cod threat reductiomprove current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on theegimes; support to treaty negotiation and implementation; strategicof wMD-related networksphold Agency leadership commitments to openness, while protecting theCollection programs and specialized signals intelligence analysesity interests of the USWINPAC and-to a lesser extent- the office of transnational issues now embracewide the American public with valuable insight into the workings of their Govermuch of what was in the Office of Scientific Intelligence when it and the office oferged in 1980CENTER FOISTUDY OF INTELLIGENCEtory Staff in the CIA Center for the Study ofence fosters understanhe Directorate of science andnology(DS&T)is the Central Intelligence Agencys IAgency's historyonship to today s intelligence challenges byad component for tackling technical challenges The Directohts to the cla workforce other us governmenttraced back to the years 1954 through 1962 when the U-2 program was conceivedagencies, and the public
CiA historians research topicsencand the director of Central Intelligence(dci) consolidated the scientific and technicalactivities and disseminate their knowledge through publications, courses, briefings, andtalents of the CIA DS&T offices create and apply innovative technology to meet inte-Web-based products They also work with other Intelligence Community historians ongence needs The Directorate's work ranges from exploratory researchublication and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to intelligencedevelopment, and operation of specialized intelligence systems, both large and smaCIAStaff coprogram of oral histrectorate is actively engaged in every collection discipline: imagery intelligencenterviews that arepreservingal memories that are notMIND), signals intelligence (SIGINT), human sources intelligence(HUMINT), andred in the documentary recordw-how, it also supports all phases of the intelligence process msignature intelligence(MABytical techlysiduct
OVERVIEW OF THE OFFICE OFwing World War II saw unparalleled growtHajor bureaucratic and organizational changes withinlogical developments, and nowhere was this truer than in thetelligence Community TheSCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCEEast-West competition during the Cold War New andC列圖ded unique advantagesboth sides offered opportunities for new weapons and to tlits allies in waging and winning the cold warnew collection techniques The prospect of new Soviet capabilities ledDS&T INTELLISENCCE OF SCC INTELLIGENCE: WAGING AND WINNING THE COLDWARechnologies(for our own purposes) but also the extent and nature ofoviet capabilities Urgent new collection requirements necessitatee emergence of the Cold War accelerated the development of eis overview and collection of documents and other material related to the officeW, more sophisticated means of collection, which in turn required more technically advanced weapons and generated early recognition oientific Intelligence (oSI) offer a glimpse of ClA's overall contribution to the analyew technical analysis techniques and capabilities
The data acquired the need for additional technical intelligence For US policymakers thisoy these new collection systems often helped clarify gaps in our intel- meant obtaining data on Soviet weapons developments and operationalSoviet capabilities in sciligence Thus, the need for scientific and techncepts, identifying important new systems and, most important, de-ntended to be definitive, or even complete, with respect to all the activities associatedthe sovietated a wholeofforveloping the technical means for collecting and plany of whiwith the Agency's scientific and technological capabilities, analysis, andg reportingns development playWith this as backgrs clear that the development of techtpecially important role in the initial extension of technical intoat CIA2 led to signifithe Cold War In this regard, the transfer of the Manhattanderstanding of the unique role OSI played in the Agency's historyanalysis of Soviet S&T capabilities A corollary to this development Project intelligence grouthe department of state to the news excerpted in argeCAs Analsis of SovetTechnolog in Taichung theection, processing and analysiss
012347(1947)091847010149082849explodesst atomic bom080855erbert ScovILLE named Assistant Director070456Scientific Intelligence (AD/SI) and D/OS00457072159K-l launchedFirst NIE published on Soviet S&050160shot down081960030863ScOVILLE leaves osl becomes DD/RPFIAB recommends to10166es its firs(Bud) WHEELON0615
63AD/SI DOSI0926566101962Cuban missile crbecomes acting DDs&TDDS&T formed: WheELoN becomes dD/s&082263100163Don chamberlain named Daos110763Carl DUCKETT090473110763om merger of FMSACnd OSI/Defensive Systems DivisionChief esac010675092073Ernest (Zeke) ZELLMER named D/OWes dirks becomes dds&ed ADDsSayre STEVENS becomes DDI1122OSi and owI move011280Herbert ROTHENBERG named acting DYOSIoSI no longer exists after 31 years111988New Headquarters BuildCIAOf the 50 original ClA Trailblazers honored during the CIAs 501997)arl Duckett, Hank Lowenhaupt, Lloyd LauderArchie Roy burks and Leslie dirks
C05288135rUz95833b)(1)>25YsEo1295862(),0江CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWashington, D CAcsc31 December 1948ENERAL ORDERNUMBER 13being distributed confirm theacing the Scientific2
Dr Willard Machle has been appointed as Assistant Director forScientific IntelligenuDrectortral IntelligenceDISTRIBUTION: Approved for Release by CIA0011
c05288135CO P￥al order No 13, dated 31 December 1948, established theofficethorized Table of OrganizatieofThis orderestab0/sr:IAs the primary intelligence evaluation, analysis and productioncomponent of CIA with exclusive responsibility for the productionand presentation of national scientific intelligencerestimatesintelligence reports andto present and interpret thestatus,nd significance of foreignscientifiand developmentB wRich affecthe capabilities and potentials of all foreignnations12 Makentive review of basic scientific intelli-ed by other agencies and advises ORE onfor inclusion in the National Intelli-3 Participates in the formulation of the NationalScientific Intelligence Objectives4
Evaluates available scientific intelligence information and intelligance; assesses its adequacy,accuracy, and timeliness, and prepares reports ofsorce exploitation and producing agencies to assurethat all significant fields of scientific intelligencebearing on the National security are adequately covered5 Formulates requirements for the collection andexploitation of scientific intelligence data inorder to insure receipt of materials necessary forulfillment of production requirements6 In collaboration with appropriate CIA components andthe IAC agencies, advises and aids in the develoment, coordination and execution of the overallplans and policies for inter-agency scientificintelligence productionCo Y3s÷!3000113